The aim of this paper is to assess the extent to which stock market information can be used to estimate leading indicators of bank financial distress. This issue is of importance because of the increased emphasis on market forces by the Basel II committee (pillar 3). We specify a Logit early warning model, designed for European banks, which is used to test if market based indicators add predictive value to models relying on accounting data. Tests are also conducted to study the robustness of the link between market information and financial downgrading in the light of the too-big-too-fail (safety net) and the bank opacity (asymmetric information) hypotheses. Whereas some of our results support the use of market related indicators (in line with those previously obtained in the literature), we show that the accuracy of the predictive power is dependent on the extent to which bank liabilities are market traded. For banks which heavily rely on (insured) deposits, the market seems unable to convey useful information and the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks does not contribute to any improvement in the expected link.
Introduction
Until the early 90's early warning models of bank financial distress essentially relied on public information contained in financial statements (accounting data) and on macroeconomic variables. In recent years recommendations have aimed to enlarge the role of market forces to promote safe and sound banking systems as well as the use of market information by bank supervisors to improve the assessment of bank financial conditions (Berger, Davies and Flannery [2000] , Flannery [1998, 2001] ).
This increased emphasis on market forces is at the heart of the new regulatory framework developed by the Basel Committee on Banking and Supervision (Basel II Accord) which includes market discipline as one of its three pillars (BIS [2003] ). By imposing greater disclosure the aim is to improve the quality of the information provided by banks to investors; market forces are therefore assumed to reinforce bank capital regulation and supervision to ensure safety. Under market discipline market prices and returns reflect the accurate level of individual bank risk because, unlike insured depositors, market investors will require a risk premium which may increase banks' cost of funding and therefore reduce risk taking incentives. Consequently, it has been suggested that market prices could be used by supervisors as signals and also complement accounting data in the design of early warning systems.
Under such an approach, as noted by Feldman and , a major issue is whether the benefits from employing market information outweigh the costs and therefore ensure an efficient allocation of supervisory resources. Consequently, because the cost of using market information can be very high, a central question is whether market prices convey additional information which is not already included in accounting data (Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2002] ).
Recent papers studying US banks have investigated the predictive power of models in which market variables are added to standard call report financial data (Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2002, 2003] , ). Their findings support the idea that market variables improve the assessment of bank financial health. In the European context Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] focused on selected market indicators and their use as leading indicators of bank financial distress. Their results show that indicators derived from market prices are able to predict changes in bank financial health at a relatively long time horizon.
They also insist on the additional contribution of market indicators relatively to an average indicator based on accounting data.
The objective of this paper is two-fold: firstly, to construct an early warning system of bank financial distress specifically designed for European banks, and secondly to raise further issues, in the light of modern intermediation theory, ignored by the existing literature. More precisely, we start by building an early warning model based on downgrades by three rating agencies (Moody's, Standard and Poors and Fitch) and a large set of accounting and market indicators. We then raise the issue of the additional contribution of market indicators based on stock prices and specifically as regards the information conveyed by market prices for banking institutions which are inherently opaque firms (asymmetric information). We also question the opportunity of relying on market information in the light of the too-big-to-fail issue and the reliance on a safety net, that is the likelihood that a bank receives support from official or other sources (systemic risk).
The rest of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 discusses the issue and relates it to the existing literature. Section 3 presents our methodology to estimate an early warning model and to test our different propositions. Section 4 defines our sample and shows how our leading indicators were constructed. Section 5 presents our empirical findings and section 6 concludes.
Issue and related literature
The issue of the reliance on market prices either to assess bank individual risk, the accuracy of market discipline in banking, or to specifically predict bank financial distress has been widely addressed in the literature (see Flannery [1998, 2001] ). In a strand of this literature the prices of different types of securities issued by banks (shares, bonds, subordinated bonds, certificates of deposits…) have been used to study the link between market variables and bank risk. Building on the findings of these papers another issue focused on the potential for market prices to serve as early signals of bank failures or financial distress.
Most of the existing literature focused on the prediction of large events such as actual bank closures or sharp downgrades by rating agencies or by official sources (supervisory ratings). Studying US banks, Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2003] showed that the prediction of a CAMEL (supervisory) rating downgrade to the lowest levels can be significantly improved by adding market variables to a set of accounting indicators. However, this predictive power was found to be significant only for banks in the greatest financial distress. Similarly, Gunther, Levonian and Moore [2001] showed that the inclusion of a market indicator such as the expected default frequency (EDF) improves the predictive power of a model based on accounting ratios and CAMEL ratings.
To our knowledge only one study was dedicated to the case of European banks (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] ). Based on a panel of 15 countries, their aim was to compare the properties of stock market and subordinated debt data as early indicators of Fitch/IBCA downgrades to C or below reflecting severe financial distress. They also showed that, beyond the information conveyed by a composite score variable based on accounting data, the equity market-based distance to default (KMV [2003] ) significantly improves predictions up to an 18 months time horizon. This paper extends the earlier studies in several directions by proposing a framework which can be implemented for European banks and which enables to further raise two theoretical issues neglected in the existing literature.
Firstly, based on a broad panel of European banks our approach combines different frequency data (annual for accounting data and daily for market data) without imposing underlying restrictive assumptions implicit to some of the existing empirical models which are discussed in the next section.
Secondly, we focus on the predictive power of a large number of market indicators estimated solely from stock prices. Because European markets for other securities issued by banks (such as bonds or subordinated bonds) generally suffer from insufficient liquidity (inactive trading) our analysis is restricted to equityholders incentives and uses, in contrast to earlier studies, a greater variety of market indicators.
Thirdly, instead of focusing on bank failures or on severe financial distress we consider the prediction of any downward change in a bank's financial health. In this sense our view is that early detection of downgrades may play a major role in the implementation of prompt corrective action by regulators without jeopardizing strategic orientations followed by bank managers. In this sense we deal with the issue of identifying banks' future financial health deterioration by considering the information contained in the changes in indicators (financial ratios and/or market variables) rather than in their level as in previous studies.
Fourthly, our objective is also to test the robustness of results in the light of modern financial intermediation theory developed in the steps of Leland and Pyle [1977] , Diamond and Dybvig [1983] and Diamond [1984] . Banks and financial intermediaries are considered as agents that play a major role in the financial system as information intermediaries. They collect and process information namely about loan customers (Diamond 1984 (Diamond , 1991 which implies that they possess private information. As such, market participants (outsiders) should have limited ability to monitor banks and market discipline in the banking industry should not play a prominent role. Therefore, due to the inherent opacity of banks (opacity effect) and the need to support large banking institutions (too-big-to-fail effect) we question the ability of market indicators to accurately predict future financial distress for different types of banks and financial institutions.
Methodology
As a first step, we implement a procedure to test for the specific and additional contribution of various market indicators to the prediction of bank financial distress. We then study the stability of the predictive power of early warning market indicators with respect to bank size and balance sheet structure.
Identifying the additional contribution of market indicators
Assessing the ability of market indicators to predict bank financial distress requires the choice of an event capturing the changing status of each bank. In the absence of actual bankruptcies in the European banking industry in sufficient number, we identify changes in a bank's financial condition through downgrading announcements by three rating agencies (Fitch, Standard & Poors, and Moody's) . Most studies on US banks considered either explicit bank failures or supervisory ratings (Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2003] , Gunther, Levonian and Moore [2004] ). Because of the lack of access to explicit supervisory ratings in Europe which are confidential in most countries, we rely on public information disclosed by private agencies. In this sense the selection of our events is close to the method developed by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] who use downgrades of Fitch individual ratings to C or below as a proxy of bank failure. In contrast to their study, and because we are more concerned by the actual information content of stock prices than their ability to forecast failures, we consider that any downgrading announcement should be retained in our study. This implies that a deterioration in a bank's financial health is captured in our study by a downgrading from any initial level and down to any level below. Identifying both narrow and broad changes is essential for the robustness of results and provides a more general framework for early warning models estimation. Also, accounting for downgrades by more than just one rating agency ensures that, in our specification, the event date is the earliest possible with respect to announcements by one of the three major agencies covering financial institutions in Europe.
We then define two sets of variables : accounting indicators and equity market based indicators likely to predict a future downgrade in a bank's financial condition. When assessing the link between the dependent variable and early warning indicators several shortcomings need to be tackled. Firstly, the different variables are not available at the same frequencies (daily for market indicators, yearly for accounting indicators). Whereas some studies proceed by linear or more advanced interpolation of low frequency data (i.e. Gropp et alii [2005] ) we consider that such a procedure is not convenient because it implies that in some cases future information may be used to explain current downgrades. Therefore instead of departing from each event (downgrade by a rating agency) to then compute all the relevant accounting and market indicators on a backward given time horizon we deal with the issue of predictability departing from each date at which accounting data information is available. In the case of European banks this date is 31 December of each year. We then consider events taking place in the four subsequent quarters following this date.
Formally, consider that for each of the N banks of the sample, there are T observations through time for accounting indicators. These dates are retained as the starting point for the prediction implementation. To ensure that our empirical implementation relies on clean and robust events we then impose that, for a bank (b), a starting point (t) and a (K) horizon forecast (K = 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters ahead), the value taken by the dependant binary variable Y is equal to :
. 1 if downgrading occurs for this bank (b) within [t, t + K] with no upgrading taking place during the whole calendar year to avoid noise around the event date. When several downgrades are announced only the first date is taken into account.
. 0 if the rating remains unaltered throughout the end of the calendar year;
. in any other case, Y is considered as "non available" NA 1 .
The following figure illustrates the definition of the dependant variable (0, 1, NA) for a 3 quarters horizon forecast :
1 Alternatively, our setting could also account for upgrades. Because our aim is to focus on financial deterioration by using rating changes as proxies, we ignored upgrades. Consequently, in our setting, the prediction of downgrades (Y = 1) is more stringent because the significance of explanatoy variables is a priori more difficult to establish.
By defining the dependant variable as such we prevent the same values taken by accounting or market indicators from being related with different rating changes occurred for a given bank. For a given prediction horizon (1, 2, 3 or 4 quarters), there are, theoretically, N × T observations Y i for the explained binary variable where i refers to a bank (b), a starting prediction point (t) and a forecasting horizon (K):
Accounting C ji(b, t, K) and market M li (b, t, K) indicators are computed at a starting point (t), that is on December 31 th of each year. Consequently, the interpolation of the missing accounting data as implemented by Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] to estimate their distance to default indicator is suitably avoided ensuring that the information content of accounting data based indicators is not inappropriately upward biased (prediction at time t 0 based on data obtained by interpolation of past but also future data regarding financial condition at time t 1 > t 0 ). Formally, this means that the estimation of early indicators incorporating accounting data or both accounting and market data (such as the distance to default) is not performed using information on the state of the world subsequent to the prediction date.
To assess the relationship between market and accounting early warning indicators and rating downgrades we use a logit model at four time period horizons to estimate the probability of a downgrade :
where For each prediction horizon (models 1 to 4), the most powerful predictors of financial deterioration are selected in the following manner. As a first step, we investigate the predictive power of the sole accounting indicators regardless of market information. The most performing indicators are selected via a stepwise process 2 .
2 As a common rule of thumb, we retained a 5 % level for type 1 error ; a Max (Min) LR statistic was used as a criterion for adding (ruling out) each potential indicator to (from) the selected set.
Such a procedure identifies the sub-set of accounting indicators that optimally predict financial weakening. As a second step, we assess the marginal contribution of market indicators by extending the filtering process (stepwise) to a large set of market indicators by adding the latter to the optimal sub-set of accounting indicators obtained in the first step.
Predicting downgrades : too-big-to-fail and opacity effects
We then test for the stability of the above relationship by allowing for possible size effects or bank opacity effects. We control for such effects by conducting several tests.
Firstly, dummy variables are constructed capturing too-big-to-fail banks or banks likely to benefit from either a public or private support (safety net). Such variables are also defined on the basis of a set of standard financial ratios which are generally used as opacity proxies in the literature. Dummies are then introduced in the different models (models 1 to 4) to conduct a series of stability tests. Secondly, tests are also carried out by estimating the different models on restricted samples of banks.
Sample and indicators
4.1. Sample The sample consists of events (downgrades or absence of downgrades) related to 64
European banks regularly listed on the stock market and for which ratings from at least one of the three major rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's or Standard and Poors) are available during the 1995-2002 period. Table 1 presents the distribution of these banks by country and specialisation.
Daily market data (bank stock prices) are taken from Datastream International and annual income statements and balance sheets come from Bankscope Fitch IBCA. Our sample of banks is restricted to EU banks for which market data is reliable for the purpose of our study. Only actively and regularly traded stocks were considered. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on our sample of banks which exhibits a relatively high level of heterogeneity. This enables us to investigate further on the robustness of the relationship between early indicators and the probability of financial deterioration with respect to differences in size or balance sheet structure. Table 3 provides information about Fitch, Moody's and Standard and Poors' ratings.
Financial deterioration indicator
These ratings are employed to build the binary dependent variable previously defined.
Because the method used to construct the dependent variable implies several restrictions (discussed in the previous section) only a limited number of downgrades are taken into account. As a whole, because only the first date is used to construct the binary variable Y when a bank is subsequently downgraded by different rating agencies, our final (clean) set is limited to 63 downgrades (28 by Standard and Poors, 23 by Fitch and 12 by Moody's) distributed as follows : 16 for the first quarters, 14 for the second quarters, 9 for the third quarters and 24 for the fourth quarters. Sources : Bankscope Fitch IBCA
Accounting indicators
As mentioned previously, we define several accounting indicators C i(b,t) that are likely to predict bank financial deterioration. Table 4 defines the set of ratios R i(b,t) which we employ and which are commonly used in the literature to assess banks' financial condition. These ratios R i can be distributed into four categories corresponding to the CAEL rating : Capital, Asset quality, Earnings and Liquidity. Several ratios are defined for each category.
Accounting ratios can be introduced in such prediction models either in level or in variation (first order difference). Most of the previous studies considered these ratios in level (Gunther, Levonian and Moore [2001] , Curry, Elmer and Fissel [2002] ) which can be justified when it comes to predict an event like a failure. However, if the aim is rather to predict a change in financial health it seems more appropriate to introduce not the values taken by the ratios, but their time changes. Besides, in this study, all banks are treated equally regardless of their initial financial strength. This means that the downgrade of a sound and safe bank (as might be reflected by the level of financial ratios) can only be captured by changes in the values of ratios. Also, because our sample consists of banks with a broad range of ratings, considering the values taken by financial indicators would be inappropriate. Therefore we define C ji (b, t) , the change in the value of the accounting ratio R ji as :
Accounting indicators used in this study are these changes further denoted by C ji(b,t). 
Market indicators
We can reasonably assume that the equity market conveys useful information to predict financial deterioration. If the market is efficient, prices and returns should incorporate the risk exposure of banks and thus their default risk. Table 5 (variables reflecting market assessment of risk or the probability of failure).
Empirical results
As a preliminary stage we consider the predictive power of each indicator by running logistic regressions in which each explanatory variable is introduced separately. We then present the best performing accounting based models for the different prediction horizons.
The additional contribution of market indicators is then assessed by augmenting each model with market indicators which are selected by the stepwise procedure. Eventually, tests are conducted to study the robustness of the predictive power of market indicators with respect to bank size (too-big-to-fail effect) and bank balance sheet structure (opacity effect). This table reports simple logit estimation results : for each model, the dependent variable is separately regressed on each explanatory variable and a constant. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings (whatever their extent) occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Model 5 explains only downgradings occurring in less than 4 quarters and reflecting quasi-insolvency. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis.
Individual contribution of indicators
On the whole, the coefficients associated to changes in profitability ratios (ΔROA and ΔROE) or to loan loss provisions (ΔDOTCB) are significant only for the longer horizons (2, 3
and 4 quarters). Inversely changes in capital ratios (ΔKPCN et ΔKPD) perform significantly only for the shortest horizon (1 quarter). These results suggest that income statement information (flows) allows earlier prediction of financial downgrades whereas balance sheet information (stocks) which is by definition less flexible might only be useful for relatively shorter horizons. The negative (expected sign) and significant contribution of the change in the liquidity ratio (ΔALREF) for the shortest horizon solely suggests that downgrades are shortly preceded by a partial liquidation of liquid assets. However, similarly to balance sheet information this signal can only be employed at a short horizon. On the whole, these preliminary results favour indicators which combine information contained in both balance sheets and income statements for longer horizons predictions.
The results obtained in table 6 for market indicators show that for every time horizon a number of market based variables significantly predict financial deterioration (downgrades).
In each logistic regression (for every prediction horizon) the coefficients of the variables capturing downward or upward trends in stock prices or negative cumulative returns (LNP and RCUM_NEG) are highly significant with the expected sign. Cumulative excess returns (EXCRCUM) are significant for three out of four horizons. If we consider the longest horizon (1 year) the coefficient of the cumulative return variable (RCUM) and the coefficient of the negative cumulative market excess return (EXCRCUM_NEG) are also significantly different from 0. These preliminary results suggest that market based indicators may well contribute to predict financial difficulties at a relatively long time horizon.
To check for the robustness of these different results, with regards to our sample, regressions (which are not presented here) were also ran by retaining for each quarter only the downgrades which occurred within the considered quarter. This experiment, which restricts the number of observations, lead to similar results.
The results obtained in models 1 to 4 are also compared to those that are obtained when early indicators are used to predict severe financial difficulties (model 5 in table 6). In model 5 the dependant variable is constructed using downgrades in the Fitch Individual rating to C or below as in Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] 5 as well as downgrades in Moody's financial strength ratings to similar levels (our sample contains 17 "clean" (Y=1) downgrades of this type). These ratings aim to assess the financial strength of an institution by explicitly removing the safety net, that is the likelihood of being supported by a parent bank or by public authorities. The obtained results clearly show that among our relatively large set of accounting and market indicators, variables which could be retained to predict downgrades of any level (weak or strong deterioration in financial strength) are also significant to predict sharp downgrades (failure or quasi-failure). Namely, there is no significant market based variable present in model 5 (prediction of failures) which is absent from equations 1 to 4 (prediction of either severe or moderate financial deterioration). This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant and the accounting indicators selected by the stepwise process. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator.
Contribution of accounting indicators
In line with the method discussed in section 3, we identify for each predictive horizon the most powerful subset of accounting indicators (stepwise procedure) in explaining the probability of a future downgrade. The results (table 7) show that for every horizon accounting data information is conveyed by one or two indicators. To deal with collinearity we also conducted the stepwise procedure by considering in the set of accounting indicators variables which were not correlated. Both procedures lead to the same optimal subset of variables for every time horizon. Not surprisingly, we obtain results which are in line with those previously obtained. Indicators which better contribute to explain future rating downgrades combine information contained in both income statements and balance sheets :
the change in the return on equity (ΔROE) for horizons ranging from 2 to 4 terms and the change in the implicit interest margin variable (ΔINTAP) for the shortest horizon. For a horizon of 3 terms our results show that a change in asset quality as measured by the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (ΔPROVCB) also significantly contributes to explain future downgrades.
Additional contribution of market indicators
To assess the specific additional contribution of market indicators, each accounting information based model obtained in table 7 is augmented with market indicators. Table 8 shows the estimation results which contain only the market indicators that "survived" to the stepwise selection procedure when added to the optimal subset of accounting indicators. In this sense this procedure is based on the assumption that market information is not only a substitute to accounting information but also conveys additional information which contributes to improve the prediction of future downgrades.
The results in table 8 show that all the coefficients have the expected sign and that the regressed on a constant, the accounting indicators previously selected and the market indicators selected by the stepwise process. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator. χ 2 statistic refers to a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis of nullity of market indicator coefficients.
Size effect, opacity effect and the actual contribution of market based indicators
As discussed earlier in the paper, the contribution of market indicators to early detection of bank financial distress is a challenge to modern banking theory because theory assumes that banks acquire private information on borrowers which may be ignored by outsiders.
Banking theory also insists on negative external effects induced by liquidity services offered by banks supporting the existence of public safety nets in practice for at least the largest banking institutions. In this sense the market may less react to changes in financial conditions for large institutions implying a lower contribution of market prices to predict future failure.
Conversely, one could assume that the market mainly focuses on the largest institutions because information may be less reliable for smaller banks. Identically, bank opacity may also affect the marginal contribution of market indicators. In the banking literature, private information is often captured by assessing the structure of financial statements. In theory, opacity comes from the intermediation function of banks and is often proxied by the ratio of loans to total assets. Since deposits are insured and deposit interest rates are not marked to market alternatively the ratio of deposits to total assets is also another frequently employed proxy. Conversely, large issues of non insured securities such as bonds or subordinated bonds (market funded liabilities) should induce market discipline hence contributing to improve the quality of the information conveyed by the market. Because liquidity is essential for market signals to transmit accurate information, the extent to which liabilities are market funded is crucial. Therefore the proportion of market funding on the liability side of the balance sheet is also considered as a determinant variable in several studies.
The size effect and the opacity effect are assessed by first estimating for each horizon an augmented model specified as follows :
where D i is a dummy variable, capturing either the size effect (DBIG i ) or the opacity effect (DOPAC i ). Two tests are then conducted first to determine the effectiveness of each effect (H 0 : α' = 0 and γ' l = 0 ∀ l) and then to assess the assumption that size or opacity outweighs or neutralizes the predictive power of each market indicator (H 0 : γ l + γ' l = 0 ∀ l).
Size effect
Tables 9 shows the results obtained for the size effect. DBIG is a binary variable which equals 1 if total bank assets are higher than 300 billion euros (a significant threshold in our sample asset size distribution) or if the considered bank is the first or second largest bank in its country ranking ; otherwise it equals 0. On the basis of the first criterion (asset size) we checked that every bank with a total asset value above 300 billion euros was assigned a Fitch Support rating equal to 1. This support rating indicates the likelihood of public or private support on a scale from 1 to 4; a grade of 1 (the highest) indicates the presence of an assured legal guarantee. The second criterion (country ranking) was introduced because banks which may be considered as relatively small in our sample may benefit from a major position in their domestic banking system. An alternative way to construct the binary variable is to solely consider the Fitch Support rating (Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] used ratings 1 and 2 to identify too-big-to-fail banks but in a different setting). However, this rating was not reported for all the banks in our sample throughout the studied period . Also, the use of a continuous variable such as the log of total assets, which is common in the empirical literature, is irrelevant in the case of our cross European analysis because it would not render country specific characteristics (size difference of the largest banks in each banking system, institutional arrangements…). 
0.13 %*** 0.95 %*** 2.66 %** 24 % Risk level to reject : γ l + γ l ' =0 ∀ l 1.03 %** 18 % 2.02 %** 0.19%*** This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Size effect is taken into account with a dummy variable (DBIG) associated with the constant and the market indicators. DBIG is equal to 1 if bank's total assets is greater than 300 billions of euros or if the bank is ranked first or second in its country, and 0 otherwise. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator.
The results show that for a horizon up to 9 months, DBIG is significant and positive which suggests that the size effect may well be attributable to other factors such as closer scrutiny of rating agencies for the largest banks. For relatively smaller banks LNP is no longer significant except for a 12 months horizon. EXCRCUM is only significant for smaller banks (level 2 test) for a 6 months horizon. We checked for the robustness of these results by running our stepwise method separately on our two samples of small and large banks. The results, which are not presented here, showed that all our market indicators were rejected (no significant additional prediction value) for the sample of small banks in model 1 and in model 3 whereas market indicators were highly significant in improving the prediction of future downgrades for the sample of large banks. On the whole, whereas Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes [2005] show that safety net issues do not alter the predictive power of market indicators, suggesting that stockholders do not expect to be rescued along with debtholders in case of default, our results are more mitigated. Instead of underlining the lack of reaction (or the less significant reaction) of large banks' stock prices (too-big-to fail effect) we present evidence (although only in 2 models out of 4) that a decrease in asset size may undermine the ability of stock prices to transmit useful information on future bank financial health.
Opacity effect
Several definitions of the binary variable DOPAC were considered to study the link between the degree of bank opacity and the predictive power of market variables. We considered the ratio of Net Loans to Total Assets, the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets, the ratio of Subordinated Debt to Total Assets, and the ratio of Market Funded Liabilities to Total The results in table 10 show that the significance of both LNP and LNPxDOPAC increases with the prediction horizon and reaches the 1% level in model 4 which suggests that opacity is more likely to alter the predictive power of market variables for the longest horizons. In almost all cases (models 2, 3, 4) the coefficients of market indicators (LNP and EXCRUM) and the coefficients of the interacting indicators (LNPxDOPAC and EXCRUMxDOPAC) are of opposite sign and significant. Therefore a higher degree of opacity tends to weaken the existing link between market indicators and the probability of a future downgrade. Based on the results of the γ l + γ l ' = 0 test, the predictive power of market indicators is totally outweighed by bank opacity, a result which holds for the 4 models and which is also all the banks with a Support rating = 1 and 10 out of the 17 banks with a Support rating = 2. 7 One can refer to Goyeau, Sauviat and Tarazi (2001) and Crouzille, Lepetit and Tarazi (2004) for a discussion on the use of these ratios as private information proxies.
confirmed by conducting the stepwise process on the sample of opaque banks showing (results not presented here) that none of our market indicators can predict downgrades for such banks. A similar result which is not displayed here is obtained when the dummy variable is constructed on the basis of the ratio of Deposits to Total Assets. However, tests conducted with the subordinated debt ratio were not conclusive indicating that the predictive power of market variables is independent of the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks. regressed on a constant, the accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Opacity effect is taken into account with a dummy variable (DOPAC) associated with the constant and the market indicators. DOPAC is equal to 1 if the value of the ratio market funded liabilities / total assets is lower than its median (25.63%), and 0 otherwise. Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The number of observations differs in the different models because all data are not available for each bank, each year and each indicator.
To check for robustness, the augmented models 1 to 4 were also estimated on 4 different panels of banks on the basis of the structure of their balance sheets (table 11) to isolate the impact of marked to market assets and liabilities. Panel A consists of banks exhibiting a high degree of loan activity (low proportion of marked to market assets) weakly funded by insured deposits (high proportion of market funded liabilities); 2/ Panel B is limited to banks with a relatively high proportion of loans and weakly reliant on market debt; 3/ Panel C contains banks with a low loan activity funded to a large extent with insured deposits; 4/ Panel D is relative to banks with a low degree of loan activity mainly funded with market debt. More precisely, 2 criteria are taken into account to discriminate banks : the ratio of net loans to total assets (the extent to which assets are not marked to market) and the ratio of market funded liabilities to total assets (the extent to which a bank relies on insured and non marked to market liabilities). The medians of both ratios were used to define the 4 panels (25.63% for the ratio of market funded liabilities and 54.32% for the loan ratio).
Our main objective here is to assess the extent to which abundant market debt is likely to induce changes in the opacity of bank assets. In other words, does the predictive power of market indicators solely depend on the structure of bank liabilities (amount of market debt)?
Are market participants (who should have strong incentives to discipline heavily market funded banks) able to process information when bank assets are, to a large extent, not market 
Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to assess the extent to which stock market prices can contribute to improve the prediction of future bank financial distress and thus to question the role and effectiveness of market discipline in the banking industry. By implementing a logit econometric model specifically designed for European banks we tested for the additional contribution of market based indicators (relatively to public financial statements) using a large set of accounting and stock market indicators. Whereas some of our results support the use of market related indicators (in line with those previously obtained in the literature), we show that the accuracy of the predictive power is dependent on the extent to which bank liabilities are market traded. For banks which heavily rely on (insured) deposits, the market seems unable to convey useful information and the amount of subordinated debt issued by banks does not contribute to any improvement in the expected link. This table reports logit estimation results obtained with the dependent variable regressed on a constant, the accounting indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Four sub-samples are taken into account on the basis of two ratios ; net loans/ total assets and market funded liabilities/ total liabilities. These ratios are considered high if their value is higher than the median (25.63% for market funded liabilities/ total liabilities and 54.32% for net loans/ total assets). Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. 
Test of the null hypothesis of absence of predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio subordinated debt/ total assets is lower than its median, H 0 : γ l + γ l ' = 0 ∀ l Test of the null hypothesis of absence of predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio subordinated debt/ total assets is higher than its median, H 0 : γ l = 0 ∀ l indicators and the market indicators previously selected. Two sub-samples are taken into account depending on the value of the ratio deposits/ total assets. This ratio is considered high if it is higher than the median (67.57%). The dummy variable DUMSUBA associated with the constant and the market indicators is equal to 1 if the value of the ratio subordinated debt/ total assets is lower than its median (1.51%). Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 explain downgradings occurring respectively in less than 1, 2, 3 and 4 quarters. Standard errors are adjusted using the Huber-White method. *, ** and *** indicate significance respectively at 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Z-statistics are shown in parenthesis. The last line of the table gives the levels of risk to reject the null hypothesis of absence of predictive contribution of market indicators when the ratio subordinated debt/ total assets is lower than 1.51%.
